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ABSTRACT. Password based authentication remains the most commonly 
used authentication mechanism, in spite of the rapid introduction of several 
other authentication mechanisms such as smart cards, graphical passwords 
and biometrics. Users mainly rely on password guidelines to construct their 
password; nevertheless existing password guidelines seem inadequate espe-
cially from the perspective of influencing the users’ security compliance be-
havior. Thus, this study intended to investigate ways to improve the content 
of password guidelines through persuasion approach to increase the likeli-
hood of compliance behavior. A control laboratory experiment was carried 
out and the results were critically discussed. The outcomes indicate promis-
ing findings that users can be persuaded to improve their security compli-
ance behavior by including more persuasive elements in the password 
guidelines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Typical end users rely on a set of rules known as password guidelines, to which users must 
adhere when choosing a password. A password guideline mainly contains specific require-
ments on how a password should be composed. For example, the password must contain a 
minimum number of characters that must include uppercase letters or numbers and should not 
include words from the dictionary. There exist various types of password guidelines; howev-
er, there is consensus in the literature that well written password guidelines can provide in-
creased security to the organizations (Campbell, Kleeman & Ma, 2006; Summer & Bosworth, 
2004). It is posited here that password guidelines should include rationales as to why creating 
good (strong) passwords is important for users. Providing a rationale will increase the likeli-
hood of compliance to a certain request (Cialdini, 2001). 
This is especially lacking with the existing password guidelines, which focus more on 
providing information on how to compose a good password. Therefore, this study aims to 
investigate ways to improve the content of password guidelines. In conjunction with the in-
clusion of a rationale in the password guidelines, this study attempts to utilize two persuasion 
approaches: appeal strategy and two of the Cialdini’s weapons of influence, to increase the 
likelihood of compliance. Generally, in order to guide this study, two research questions were 
formulated as follows; (1) Will users create better passwords when a rationale (i.e. an expla-
nation of why creating good passwords is important) is included in the password guidelines? 
and (2) which persuasion strategies are more likely to result in influencing users to create 
better passwords? 
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The following section will briefly discuss some related work, research methodology along 
with the procedures of the experimental work involved. Results and analysis will then pre-
sented followed by an interesting discussion, conclusion as well as future work. 
 
RELATED WORK 
There are only few studies that have focused on the construction of password guidelines. 
As pointed out by Komanduri et al. (2011), there is lack of empirical data on passwords and 
the guidelines under which they were created. For instance, the NIST guidelines (Burr, Dod-
son & Polk, 2006) which are used to design password composition policies are based on theo-
retical estimates, while several other guidelines, such as in Proctor et al. (2002) and Vu et al. 
(2007) are based on a very small-scale laboratory studies. 
Nevertheless, the content of password guidelines is important in providing suggestions to 
users on how to carry out security tasks such as creating good passwords. Besides the above 
studies, Grawmeyer and Johnson (2011) further investigated users’ password generation be-
havior and revealed that users failed to interpret the contents of security guidelines given to 
them. Based on these several finding, authors draw a conclusion to suggest that password 
guidelines contained in security policies should be devised in order to avoid misconception 
among users. 
Findings from existing studies seem to indicate that users are not convinced that such sug-
gestions given in the guidelines are extremely important. This was indirectly pointed out in 
study by Shay et al. (2010), where, in spite of users’ awareness, they were not deterred from 
continuing password practice that might put them at risk such as using dictionary words and 
names as well as sharing and reusing passwords. This study also confirms findings from pre-
vious studies (Wessels & Steenkamp, 2007; Zezschwitz et al. 2013) where users were also 
found to practice poor password habits, such as using names and birth dates to construct their 
passwords and using the same password across multiple accounts.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A controlled laboratory experiment was carried out to investigate the research questions of 
this study. The experiment used the between-subject design, where each participant is ex-
posed to only one of the experimental conditions. There will be one control group (no in-
ducement) and four experimental groups as follows; (1) Rational appeal group, (2) Emotional 
appeal group, (3) Social proof group and (4) Commitment & consistencies group (C&C). 
The apparatus used in this experiment are as follows; the instructions set, the five pass-
word guidelines for the experimental groups (including the control group), a password login 
prototype, and a set of questionnaires. The instructions sets were uniform across all partici-
pants; everyone received the same instructions and was informed that the Information System 
& Services Department of the university wanted all the students to create a new login account 
to replace the existing one. The instructions were typed on a piece of paper with a slightly 
larger font (i.e. 16 font Times New Roman) to make it clear and readable to participants.  
The password guideline sets which were distributed to the participants vary according to 
the group to which they were assigned. For example, the persuasive argument for the rational 
group was framed using logical reasoning by providing relevant examples such as the fact 
that the variety of usable characters in the passwords will significantly increase the difficulty 
in hacking the passwords. The persuasive argument for the emotional group was framed by 
attempting to invoke the participants’ emotions; this was achieved by giving examples of real 
hacking incidents which resulted in the passwords being compromised due to weakness. The 
persuasive argument for the social proof group was framed by attempting to associate the 
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participants with the current scenario of popular social networking sites (e.g. Facebook) 
where passwords being compromised could not only jeopardize important personal accounts 
but also reputation among friends as the hackers are able to take charge of their profile in the 
social networking sites. Slightly different from the first three experimental groups, the partic-
ipants in the commitment and consistency group did not receive a persuasive argument in-
forming them why creating a good password is important; instead, they received a recom-
mendation statement to request them to create a strong password as it is very important to 
ensure compliance behavior is met. The participants in this group were then requested to for-
malize their agreement (i.e. to create strong password) by signing in the commitment page. 
Furthermore, the participants were told that the commitment page would be handed to and 
reviewed by the ISS departmental staff. Finally, the participants in the control group only 
received the standard NIST password guidelines similar to those received by the participants 
from other groups and nothing else. The last apparatus involved in the experiment is the set of 
questionnaires containing several questions on demographic details of the participants and 
also some questions related to password constructions and usage.  
The measurements involved in the experiment are password strength and password com-
pliance. The password strength was measured using a combination of several important at-
tributes that constitute a particular password, such as length (i.e. characters), the frequency of 
uppercase, lowercase, alphabetic characters, numerical characters and alphanumeric charac-
ters (e.g.: @, #, !, etc.). A tool known as the “Password Meter” is adopted in this study to 
measure password strength (Password Meter, 2012). The password strength is calculated by 
adding points (+) if the password exhibits certain required attributes and deducting (-) points 
if the password fails to exhibit certain attributes. The score given is in the form of percent-
ages, where the maximum will be 100%. The passwords will be categorized as weak, ac-
ceptable and strong according to the following scores; (≤ 30%), (30% ≤ x ≤ 60%) and (≥ 
60%) respectively. Therefore, the required score to indicate the compliance level is 30 points 
following the metrics as anything below is considered weak password. 
The next element that was also measured in this experiment is the password compliance. It 
is basically refers to how close each participant follows the requirements given in the pass-
word guidelines. Therefore, each requirement was allocated some points accordingly to indi-
cate the total score of compliance for each of the password created by participants.  
The experimental procedures 
The experiment was conducted at one of the public university with various departments 
ranging from sciences to social sciences. The experiment was advertised through university 
websites after being approved by the University Ethics Committee (UEC) whereby interested 
participants sent email to express their willingness to participate. 
To begin with, all participants were given a unique id number which automatically placed 
them randomly into one of the five experimental groups. They were given a brief introductory 
session to sign the consent form and supply demographic details. Following the experimental 
scenario, all participants were given a standard NIST password guideline. Participants were 
then asked to create a password for their university login account. Information on the fre-
quency of character types that constitute each participant’s invented password was collected. 
For example, if the password was p@ssword123, the data collected would have been: 7 lower 
case letters, 3 numbers, 1 special character and 11 as the length. The participants were re-
quested to log in immediately after the account had been created. Finally, the participants 
were asked to fill in short questionnaires on some related to password construction usage. 
Participants signed the remuneration form before leaving the experimental room where each 
participant was rewarded a small token of souvenir for their time and effort in participating.  
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RESULTS & ANALYSIS  
A total of 75 participants took part in the experiment, of which 31% were male. More than 
half of the participants (67%) who took part were aged between 18 – 25 years old, of whom 
about 75% were post-graduate students. The participants were almost equally divided in terms 
of technical and non-technical background; 49% and 51% respectively. The password created 
by all the participants from the five experimental groups will be examined according to sever-
al factors (i.e.: compliance, strength, length, unique characters used and number of different 
character sets) as summarized in Table 1 below.  
Table 1. Mean and (standard deviation) of several password elements analyzed accord-
ing to the five experimental groups 
Groups/ 
Passwords 
Factors 
Password 
Strength 
Password 
Compliance 
Length Unique  
Characters 
Used 
Number of 
Different 
Character 
Sets 
Rational 79.93  (18.39) 32.87 (4.03) 9.80 (1.52) 8.40 (1.29) 3.40 (0.63) 
Emotional 85.67  (17.01) 35.0 (4.80) 10.33 (1.99) 8.33 (1.68) 3.53 (0.63) 
Social proof 85.80  (19.80) 33.93 (3.73) 11.27 (2.63) 8.87 (2.03) 3.13 (0.52) 
Commitment 
& Consisten-
cies 
74.33  (20.94) 31.73 (4.50) 10.40 (2.27) 8.40 (1.68) 2.87 (0.74) 
Control 63.27 (27.85) 30.87 (5.96) 9.87 (1.92) 8.00 (1.85) 2.80 (1.01) 
*In each cell – The mean of password factors scores followed by the standard deviation in brackets.  
 
Table 2. The results for One-way ANOVA of all the password elements analyzed 
Groups/ 
Passwords 
Factors 
Password 
Score 
Password 
Compliance 
Length Unique 
Characters 
Used 
Number of 
Different 
Character 
Sets 
One-way 
ANOVA 
F=2.97,                   
p-value=0.025 
F=1.89, 
p-value=0.12 
F=1.24 
p-value=0.30 
F=0.48 
p-value=0.749 
F=2.91 
p-value=0.027 
*The items in bold shows the p-value for statistically significant difference detected 
 
Meanwhile, Table 2 reports on the One-way ANOVA test on all the password elements 
analyzed. The results of password compliance have shown that all the experimental groups 
including the control group have reached the mean compliance score above 30 points which 
indicates that in general majority of the participants in this experiment have complied with the 
requirements given in the password guidelines. This can be seen from Table 1 whereby the 
highest compliance mean score was seen to be coming from the emotional group (35.0) fol-
lowed by the social proof group (33.93) while the lowest mean score comes from the control 
group (30.87). However, there was no significance difference detected with One-way 
ANOVA test (F=1.89, p-value=0.12) which seems to indicate that the persuasion strategies 
applied did not have much of an effect on compliance level among participants in this study. 
Looking further into the passwords created by the participants, the results of their pass-
word strength have shown that the social proof group has the highest mean (85.80) followed 
by the emotional group (85.67), with the lowest being the control group (63.27). The results 
were further analyzed using One-way ANOVA and the results reveal a significant difference 
across the five conditions (F=2.97, p-value=0.025). This indicates that participants create 
stronger passwords when they receive guidelines with persuasive rationales, compared to 
passwords without persuasive rationales included in the guidelines. However, further tests are 
required to identify which of the various approaches applied is the most effective. A Tukey 
post hoc test was conducted to examine this question. The Tukey test revealed with 95% con-
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Computing and Informatics, ICOCI 2015 
11-13 August, 2015, Istanbul, Turkey. Universiti Utara Malaysia (http://www.uum.edu.my ) 
Paper No.  
152 
 
414 
 
fidence intervals, that the social proof and emotional groups are significantly different from 
the rest of the groups, indicating that more participants are persuaded with these two ap-
proaches compared to the others. 
Moreover, the passwords constructed by the participants from the social proof and emo-
tional groups, 67% of both groups had passwords that were categorized as very strong pass-
words (password score ≥ 80%). However, participants in the social proof group constructed 
much better passwords than the emotional group when comparing each element that contrib-
uted to the password score (i.e. length, unique characters used, number of different character 
sets). As can be seen from Table 1 above, the mean for all the elements mentioned above was 
higher for the social proof group compared to the emotional group. Moreover, approximately 
40% of passwords constructed in the social proof group had a perfect score (i.e. 100%) com-
pared to only 27% in the emotional group. 
The One-Way ANOVA test was also conducted towards other password elements as well 
as reported in Table 2 above. Based on the results displayed on that table, two elements of the 
passwords which are length and unique characters used indicated no significant difference – 
however, there was a statistically significant difference detected for the number of different 
characters sets used by the participants to construct their password which indicates a support-
ing factors for the significant effect detected in the password strength.  
DISCUSSION   
The control-laboratory experiment conducted has yielded results as presented in previous 
sections. At the beginning of the experiment, several research questions were formulated. In 
this section, those research questions will be revisited and discussed.  The first question asked 
whether users would create better passwords when a rationale explaining why creating a good 
password is important is included in the password guidelines. The results indicate that pass-
words created by users who receive password guidelines including a rationale are stronger 
compared to passwords created by those who did not. The results of password compliance 
seem to be consistent with the passwords strength constructed. 
Thus, these findings suggest that it is worth providing extra information to users on why 
such task as creating a good password is important. However, the challenge is to ensure that 
users will make an effort to read this information, as that which is depicted in the control-
laboratory experiment might not happen in the real world. However, one possible way to 
overcome this is to include reading and understanding the password guidelines as a compulso-
ry phase before someone could actually construct a password. This is especially worth con-
sidering if the systems or applications require a high level of password security.  
The second question focused on which persuasion strategies are more likely to result in in-
fluencing users to create better passwords. The results show that participants who are exposed 
to the emotional appeal and social proof strategies produce stronger passwords than the oth-
ers. These two strategies are probably more effective than the others as the explanations pro-
vided in the strategy easily relate to the participants (i.e. the emotional appeal uses a real life 
scenario) and social proof endorsement is probably very important to them. On the other 
hand, participants in the commitment & consistency group were found not to produce pass-
words as strong as the other experimental group, probably due to the fact that this strategy 
might not work so well in the experimental setting but might yield better performance in a 
real world scenario. This is because the impact portrayed by the surveillance factor is im-
portant to ensure this strategy works; otherwise, the audience might not be immersed in the 
effect of noncompliance.   
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CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
This article has presented the control-laboratory experiment conducted to evaluate the 
study of persuasion and individual behavior in constructing passwords. While motivating 
users’ security compliance through persuasion is practical for the password authentication 
domain, there is a more fundamental problem in this domain that needs addressing – namely 
the problem of memorability. Most people are found to cope with memory overload by rely-
ing on one or two obvious passwords (e.g.: birth dates or combination of partner’s name) but 
unfortunately although these weak passwords tend to ease the overload problem but they fail 
to offer adequate levels of protection (Briggs & Oliver, 2008). Therefore, in the next part of 
the study is to focus towards looking into alternative countermeasures which may help solve 
the memorability problem.  
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